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Abstract 
Tax compliance is the desire for every nation world over. Although investigations have been done into the effects 
of deterrent and social psychological factors on tax compliance, inconsistent results have been reported, suggesting 
that a moderator might explain the mixed results. Intrinsically, the main aim of this research is to propose the 
addition of the perceptions of corruption as having a role to play in moderating the relationships between first, 
deterrent factors and tax compliance and second, the social psychological factors and tax compliance behaviour 
among SMEs in Uganda. Once validated, the proposed model will be valuable to government in policy 
formulations and evaluation, Uganda Revenue Authority and other regulatory bodies, and practitioners.      
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1. Introduction 
Tax compliance is a major global concern that policy makers continue to grapple with in both developing and 
developed nations. Yet, raising public revenue to finance public expenditure arrangements, for instance 
infrastructure provision is one of the ultimate objectives of taxation, notwithstanding the level of economic 
development (Coolidge, Ilic & Kisunko 2009; Hansford & Hasseldine 2012; Lignier & Evans 2012; Cidália 2012).  
According to Slemrod (1992), scholarly works have focused more on the non-compliance than compliance of tax 
payers to the laws.  This seems to stem from the assumption that majority of the taxpayers hate paying taxes (Dare, 
Du Plessis & Jansen 2019).  This view is supported by the Guardian (2018) who reveals that the United Kingdom’s 
(UK) has to counter the arrogance of the Tech firms, such as Google, Facebook and Amazon, for not complying 
with the tax laws in place. This has been done by introducing a 2 percent tax charge on the UK revenue , following 
the losses the government incurs through the transfer pricing mechanism that such firms use to reduce their profits 
(Iftikhar et al. 2015). Equally, African countries seem to suffer the biggest loss from illicit financial flows due to 
potential weaknesses in tax transparency (OECD 2018), losing up to USD 80 billion by 2018.   
The Republic of Uganda in particular, has low levels of tax compliance especially among the small and 
medium-sized enterprises, notwithstanding the enforcement mechanisms like sanctions, tax audits and 
investigations by Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) office and the Tax Appeals Tribunal (Tusubira, 2018). 
According to Asingwire (2019) tax compliance among SMEs continues to be an atrocious job to attain.  Tax 
evasion, for instance seems to be on an increase for SMEs (Verberne 2018). Uganda as a country has been lagging 
behind in most of the global social and economic development competitive indices. For instance, the 2019 World 
Economic Forum Global Competitive Report, Uganda ranked to 115th position out of 141 economies studied with 
a score of 48.9 percent all due to flaws in the institutional infrastructure among other pillars of competitiveness 
(Klaus Schwab 2019) which might affect tax compliance among taxpayers. The corruption perception indices for 
the years 2012 to 2019 by Transparency International (TI) indicate that Uganda had the highest score of 29 in 2012 
for a scale of 0 -100, 0 as worst and 100 as best in the 130th position out of 176 countries, and the least score of 25 
between 2015 and 2016 respectively and a score of 28 in the year 2019 in the 137th position out of 180 nations. 
These scores categorise Uganda among the worst countries in the control of corruption in the world. Also, the 
World Economic Forum 2017-2018 reveal that the most prominent problematic areas in doing business in Uganda 
are tax rates. However, corruption might affect the nature of tax administration in the country, thereby interfering 
with the tax compliance relationships. 
Two major dimensions of the factors that influence tax compliance are; the deterrents (e.g. penalties, audit 
probability and detection, tax rates and tax complexity) (Becker, 1974; Allingham & Sandmo, 1972, 1972; Kirchler, 
Hoelzl & Wahl, 2008; Saad 2014; Saad, Udin & Derashid 2014); and the social psychological considerations (e.g. 
tax fairness, trust in authorities, corruption, social norms and tax morale) (Torgler & Schneider 2005; Kirchler et 
al. 2008; Bobek, Hageman & Kelliher 2013; Tusubira & Nkote 2013; Faizal, Palil, Maelah & Ramli 2017). Apart 
from corruption, (See; Rosid, Evans & Tran-Num 2016; Alm, Martinez-Vazquez & McClellan, 2016; Schneider 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.12, No.22, 2020 
 
47 
& Torgler 2007), scholarly works continue to  produce inconsistent and weak relationship results on the 
aforementioned variables (Raskolnikov 2009; Kogler, Muehlbacher & Kirchler 2013; Dwenger, Kleven, Rasul & 
Rincke 2016). 
Yet contextually tax compliance continues to receive little empirical research attention in Uganda. While  
Tusubira &  Nkote (2013), Nkundabanyanga, Mvura, Nyamuyonjo, Opiso & Nakabuye (2017), Musimenta, 
Nkundabanyanga, Muhwezi, Akankunda & Nalukenge (2017) have investigated SMEs tax compliance in Uganda, 
none of them  interrogates  the effects of corruption perceptions in relation to tax compliance. Therefore, this study 
set out to investigate, the moderating influence of corruption perceptions on deterrent and social psychological 
factors towards SMEs tax compliance behaviour in Uganda.  Introduction of corruption perceptions will help 
predict which variable (deterrent, and social psychological factors) has more influence on tax compliance 
behaviour (Kirchler et al., 2008; Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2010; Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler & Schabmann 2013). 
Finally, a suitable model for SMEs tax compliance model will be developed and its applicability discussed. 
 
2. Theoretical and literature review 
2.1 Tax compliance  
Tax compliance refers to the level at which taxpayers conform to the tax laws of a particular economy (Song & 
Yarbrough 1978; Palil & Mustapha 2011; Bruce-Twum 2014. As such, Tax compliance necessitates accurate 
reporting of the tax base, correct tax liability computation, and timely filing of returns and effecting of tax 
payments (Franzoni 2000; Kornhauser 2007).  Nkwe (2012) expands the scope of tax compliance to registering 
for Tax Identification Numbers, preparing and keeping proper books of accounts,  payment of tax fines welcoming 
tax audits and using competent tax advisors. Following the above views, tax compliance effectiveness seems to be 
twofold. The deferent measures that relate to compliance with tax laws, and the voluntary measures that are pegged 
on the social psychological tax demands (See; Kirchler et al. 2008; Braithwaite 2009; James & Alley 2004). 
Therefore, tax compliance by tax payers is either voluntary or enforced or both. (OECD 2001).  
We therefore contend that if the right authority is not properly recognised where taxpayers ought to file their 
returns, then noncompliance will have taken place. Secondly, in a developing country perspective where corruption 
is treasured, it would become an opportunity for taxpayers and corrupt tax officers as well as other government 
officers to divert such funds for personal purposes, including encouragement of total noncompliance irrespective 
of whether the taxpayer has made any payments to these officers. Following the above debate, and bearing in mind 
the framework in which we conduct this scholarship, we conceptualise tax compliance to mean the taxpayers 
ability to voluntarily comply with the tax code either due to their willingness to do so or by way of enforcement. 
This means that taxpayers should have the willingness and ability to declare the right incomes and tax liabilities 
to the right authorities either due to the level of trust that they have in the tax authorities arising from tax fairness 
or arising from enforcement mechanisms like audit rates, sanctions and tax rates among others. However, this 
notwithstanding, compliance might be interrupted if the effects of corruption are factored in as a moderating 
variable. 
 
2.2 Economic or deterrent factors and tax compliance 
2.2.1 Audit probability, detection and tax compliance 
A number of scholars indicate there being a number of risks of being detected. For instance, Allingham and 
Sandmo model (1972) and those who advocate for the Fischer's model (1992), put further emphasis on the 
probability of detection of noncompliance (Bosco & Mittone 1997), yet Alleyne & Harris (2017) and Carnes & 
Englebrecht (1995) put more prominence on perceived risk of detection. Allowing for the related conversations 
made by earlier scholars, the most conclusive and encompassing definition is that of Fischer, Wartick & Mark 
(1992) which proposes that the probability that tax noncompliance will be detected as revenue authorities across 
the globe strive to achieve high tax compliance levels. Indeed, Franzoni (2008) holds the same view that higher 
audit rates, may be the most important factor in encouraging tax compliance. 
While a number of empirical studies relating to audit probability, detection and tax compliance do exist, their 
results seem to be mixed and unconvincing (Alm et al. 1992; Hashimzade, Myles, Page & Rablen, 2014; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Andreoni et al. 1998). For instance, Alm & McKee (2006), report that there is a 
significant effect between tax audit probability and detection, and tax compliance among taxpayers, as cited in 
Alabede et al. (2011). Similarly, Bayer & Cowell (2015) found a noteworthy positive association between tax 
audit probability and detection on firm tax compliance. Findings from these studies insinuate that when there is 
high possibility of the authorities discovering non-compliances, then compliance among tax payers would 
definitely improve (Alm 1991). In contrast, studies from Palil, Malek & Jaguli (2016), Young (1994) and Slemrod, 
Blumenthal & Christian (2001) reveal that the likelihood of detection adversely relates with tax compliance among 
taxpayers. This is demonstrated by Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee & Torgler (2004) who indicate that 
increases in audit likelihood and penalty rates led to lower tax compliance among South African taxpayers. 
Conspicuously, there are no consistent results demonstrated by the existing scholarly works, however, audit 
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probability and detection is anticipated to have an effect on taxpayers’ compliance attitude and behaviour.  
2.2.2 Sanctions and tax compliance 
The Allingham & Sandmo’s (1972) deterrent model proposed the use of sanctions and audit probability to align 
non-compliant taxpayers with compliance behavior, since taxpayers are viewed as utility maximisers.  Therefore, 
for the sake of seeing taxpayers desist from tax non-compliance behaviour, this framework incorporates sanctions 
as one of the dimensions of power in the model (Kirchler et al. 2008).  Sanctions for tax non-compliance can be 
in terms of penalties, fine, interest, imprisonment and publications of names of non-complying taxpayers. The 
reviewed literature suggests that the size of the perceived penalties should be able to affect the likelihood of tax 
non-compliance (Varma & Doob 1998; Raskolnikov 2009). 
According to Raskolnikov (2009) a commitment to implementing government sanctions may not be the only 
way of encouraging taxpayers to pay taxes. Nonetheless getting commitment to an agreement with tax preparers 
to waive their privileges if they aid tax non-compliance, with tough standards and stronger sanctions for tax 
advisors could improve tax compliance. However, government could also implement a tax regime with a separation 
of taxpayers between the compliant and the non-compliant so that sanctions are placed on not more than one 
explicit group of taxpayers. Sanctions can be administered on taxpayers with a rational mind whose marginal 
compliance decisions largely depend on the expected tax penalty. This category of taxpayers is likely to choose 
the economic model given the costs that accrue (Raskolnikov 2009). If not differentiated, this methodology is 
likely to be wasteful when applied to taxpayers who are willing to pay their tax obligations and/or taxpayers who 
just need tax advice, respectful audits and campaigns for compliance (Raskolnikov 2009). Devos (2014), on the 
other hand, suggests a number of sanctions  while emphasizing  the need for the imposition of stronger penalties 
in response to the assertion that taxpayers weigh the uncertain benefits of successful evasion against the risk of 
detection and punishment. Despite recommending other areas for improvement (e.g. education, publicity, 
incentives), Devos (2015) contends that the punitive impact of penalties and other sanctions support the shaping 
of taxpayers’ compliance positions and behaviour. Accordingly, a penalty structure forms part of the punishment 
and is an important feature of a taxpayer’s decision to evade tax. This study seems to have been along the same 
line of thinking of that of Jackson & Jones (1985), who supported government imposition of higher penalties due 
to increased tax non-compliance with the discovery that taxpayers were more sensitive to the magnitude of 
penalties than they were to probability of detection. 
However, Jackson & Milliron (1986) and Ameyaw, Oppong, Aba Abruquah & Ashalley (2016), suggest that 
governments should take precautions when setting up policies relating to sanctions, as severe sanctions may not 
necessarily have a direct relationship with tax compliance. Other studies indicate that the social cost of sanctions 
could outweigh the benefits, as taxpayers may break up into smaller heterogeneous groups if sanctions are 
perceived as too severe, resulting in general aggression with disregard to tax legislation (Jackson & Milliron 1986; 
Ameyaw et al. 2016). In fact, Graetz & Wilde (1985), and Devos (2014) question the intrinsic worth of the 
economic theory of deterrence with the failure of penalties to improve tax compliance behavior. Hence, suggesting 
that governments need to employ a combination of factors, including auditing and reduced tax rates, so as to 
manage tax non-compliance. However, Blank (2014) proposes the use of collateral sanctions in addition to the 
customary or traditional monetary penalties, which would involve denying or withdrawal of government benefits 
in respect of perpetrators of tax non-compliance, the revocation of professional licences, and the deportation of 
those who propagate fraud and deceit in tax matters. Crawford (2013), on the other hand recognises the impact 
that effective penal provision can have in encouraging tax compliance. However, further notes that not all 
taxpayers deliberately set out to be tax non-compliant. As such, there are times, when unintentional errors and 
honest mistakes occur, probably resulting from taxpayers failing to understand the application of the law, with the 
implication that this category of taxpayers would possibly comply voluntarily if they had prior knowledge of the 
law (Saad 2010). The lack of information needed to comply, the costs involved in hiring technical staff like 
accountants and how long it takes for the tax officials to work on tax returns on submission may make it difficult 
for them to comply (Crawford 2013).  
2.2.3 Tax rate and tax compliance 
One of the factors that the economic theory of deterrence pronounces as a determinant of tax compliance is tax 
rate (Allingham & Sandmo 1972). This theory predicts that an increase in tax rates would decrease tax compliance 
(Allingham & Sandmo 1972), yet the available empirical studies provide diverse results about the effect of 
marginal tax rate on tax compliance. For instance, Clotfelter (1983), Feinstein (1991) and Slemrod (1985) show a 
positive relationship between marginal tax rate and tax non-compliance. This position is confirmed by Freire-
Seren & Panades (2013) who argues that increases in tax rate reduce taxpayers’ disposable incomes, leading to 
increased tax evasion, hence prompting an escalation in tax noncompliance. However, experiencing reductions in 
disposal incomes may cause increases in risk aversion, in turn enabling improvements in tax compliance behaviour. 
Consistent with these studies, Alm, Jackson & McKee (1992b) suggest that the likelihood of under reporting of 
income is positively related to tax rate. Saavedra, Marcincin & Valachy (1994), Ivanova, Keen & Klemm (2005), 
and Saavedra, Marcincin & Valachy (2007) however, argue for a flat tax rate, though such an opinion would to a 
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great extent advantage the rich against the majority poor.  
Baldry (1987) in an experimental investigation of the relationship between income, tax rates and tax evasion, 
designed particularly to test the predictions of the conventional expected-utility-maximisation analysis of evasion 
behavior, and found that, tax rate was insignificant, although income was positively related to evasion. Kirchler 
(2007) asserts that most economic models of rational compliance decisions do not clearly predict an effect of 
marginal tax rate on compliance nor hypothesise that higher tax rates lead to higher tax compliance. However, 
Kirchler (2007) suggests that most research shows that higher tax rates lead to less compliance. Nonetheless, Alm, 
Sanchez & De-Juan (1995) show that, higher tax rates might indirectly increase tax compliance by reducing tax 
evasion. Moreover, Yitzhaki (1974) and Piolatto & Rablen (2013) reveal that tax rates might have negative 
relationships with tax evasion, which implies that increases in tax rates might encourage taxpayers to truthfully 
declare their taxable incomes. However, rather than encouraging tax compliance through honesty, higher tax rates 
may serve as a disincentive to work by inducing the affluent to work for fewer hours, generating less wealth and 
fundamentally affecting the efficiency of the economy (Kirchler 2007), hence negatively affect tax compliance 
(Chau & Leung 2009; Mas'ud, Aliyu & Gambo 2014). In conclusion, though various studies conceived that higher 
tax rate is negatively related to tax evasion and positively related to tax compliance, other studies reveal either no 
relationship or negative relationship between tax rates and tax compliance. Based on this, Gaspar (2015) suggests 
that the theory has ambiguities in its formulation and therefore, further research is needed in this area (Freire-Seren 
& Panades 2013).  
The reviewed empirical results show that the deterrent or economic factors, namely audit probability and 
detection, sanctions in form of penalties and fines tax rate, are not consistent in predicting tax compliance 
behaviour. Some of the findings showed that these dimensions can encourage tax compliance behaviour, whereas 
others indicate that higher sanctions could lead to increased tax avoidance and evasion or have no influence on tax 
compliance behaviour. Due to the inconsistency in the relationship between deterrent factors and tax compliance 
among different taxpayers, the current study proposes the following:   
H1. Deterrent factors and tax compliance are significantly related. 
2.2.4 Tax complexity and tax compliance 
Complexity does arise when the relevant tax authorities try to improve the equity of the tax system and, at the 
same time, reduce its ambiguity (McKerchar, Ingraham & Karlinsky 2005). Therefore, findings regarding this 
construct appeared to be mixed in the literature. In particular, McKerchar (2003) claimed that, both monetary and 
non-monetary cost may be influenced by a corresponding increase in complexity, thereby causing a negative 
impact on the taxpayers' perception of fairness, as well as their respective commitment to comply. 
To reiterate further, Cox & Eger (2006) who focused on the State Road Funds in the US State of Kentucky 
claimed that procedural tax complexity contributes to an increase in tax noncompliance. In the same vein, Gambo, 
Mas'ud, Nasidi & Oyewole (2014) who studied the relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance in 
Africa under the self-assessment regime discovered a statistically significant negative relationship between tax 
complexity and tax compliance. Conversely, Kirchler, Niemirowski & Wearing (2006) found a positive 
relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance. Meanwhile, Forest & Sheffrin (2002) failed to discover 
the influence of complexity on taxpayers' perception towards fairness and compliance. Aligning to equity theory, 
Fjeldstad, Sjursen & Ali (2012) stated that when the tax system is perceived to be complex, taxpayers may stand 
to question its fairness. As such, the more complex a tax system is, the more taxpayers perceive the inequity of the 
whole system. Thus, based on the theoretical justification, tax complexity may portray some level of negativity on 
tax compliance behaviour. As a result, when the tax system is found to be complex or cumbersome, taxpayers may 
perceive the lack of equity in the system which may result in low compliance. Hence, the following proposition is 
offered: 
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
2.3 Social psychological factors and tax compliance 
2.3.1 Tax fairness perceptions and tax compliance 
Fairness is a perception; an imagination that involves an evaluation as a result of comparing one’s own situations 
or those of oneself and others (Van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel & Ybema 2006). Similarly, Farrar, Donnelly & 
Dhaliwal (2013) argue that fairness is a judgment of individuals, and individuals with referent others arising from 
actual or abstract appraisals, which has significant ethical consequences. This means that where individuals hold 
perceptions of fairness, they will develop a sense of contentment and will tend to support such a fair tax system. 
However, individuals are likely to experience anger and have negative reactions when they perceive violations of 
fairness (Schweitzer & Gibson 2008). In particular, SME taxpayers are likely to be more compliant when they 
perceive fairness of a tax system and less compliant when they perceive unfairness in such a tax system (Slemrod 
2007). Therefore, an attempt to develop a broader understanding of tax fairness could be helpful to tax authorities, 
as they might be able to use fairness as one of the compliance approaches to enhance and raise taxpayers’ spirits 
with regard to compliance behaviour (Farrar, et al. 2013). 
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According to equity theory, Bobek (1997) in Saad (2011), suggests that outcomes like services provided 
determine peoples’ perceptions of system fairness, and they consequently trust that incentives and punishments 
will be spread according to the inputs or contributions. By implication, this theory highlights exchange fairness, 
where it suggests that individuals are more likely to conform to the tax rules if the procedures used in the exchange 
contract are perceived to be fair. In the tax environment, the taxpayers and government are the parties that form 
the exchange contract. Taxpayers will notionally perceive the tax system as fair if the government is seen to be 
providing equitable proportions of benefits, such as social services, hence encouraging tax compliance otherwise 
it might trigger tax noncompliance if considered unfair (Saad 2011). 
Tax fairness is considered in three elements; distributive fairness, procedural fairness and retributive fairness. 
Distributive fairness considers the allocation function where government apportions public funds collected for the 
benefit of society (Adams 1965). Additionally, people perceiving fairness in the perspective of the benefits they 
receive will also compare their situations with their referent others, equating their benefits-contribution ratios with 
those of others in the group, and feelings of inequitable dealings can be revealed if disparities are discovered (Saad 
2011; Walster et al. 1978). Based on this principle, the theory of distributive justice assumes that people with 
comparable contributions should get equal distribution outcomes (Huseman, Hatfield & Miles 1987). Although 
the principle of exchange fairness gives prominence to the allocation of resources and rewards in exchange for 
taxes paid, there are situations in which the principle is not followed in the actual allocation of rewards (Greenberg 
1987; Schwinger 1980). On the other hand, though distributive fairness denotes fairness of tax revenue allocation, 
it might also refer to the allocation of a tax burden among taxpayers, and once perceived as fair, taxpayers will be 
encouraged to compliance with tax rules. 
Distributive justice refers to the fairness of the outcomes of resource allocation or distribution (Wenzel 2003). 
The theory looks at how taxpayers judge fairness in the distribution of outcomes. Therefore, under distributive 
fairness, the perception is that the government acts as a good custodian and wise spender of tax revenues (OECD 
2011). In Verboon & Goslinga’s (2009) assertion, typical benefits are the share of public goods one receives and 
the most important costs are the actual taxes that have to be paid. This would imply that taxpayers would be 
motivated to comply with the tax law if they perceive the government to be providing adequate services as a 
proportion of the tax revenue (Walster, et al. 1978; Gravelle & Gravelle 2006; Kirchler et al. 2006). Looking at 
retributive fairness, the negative aspect of distributive fairness, we study fair allocation of punishments (Cook & 
Hegtvedt 1983). Punishments are considered fair if the penalties enforced are commensurate with the offenses 
committed. In tax environments, various punishments are available as penalties for non-compliance behaviour. 
Therefore, retributive fairness contends that a tax system should be in a position to be able to employ such penalties 
in proportion to the level of non-compliance behaviour.  
On the other hand, Murphy (2004) considers procedural fairness as perceived fairness of the procedures used 
in decision-making and how this action is perceived by the receiver of the decision maker’s treatment. Procedural 
fairness, also called process fairness, involves the study of mechanisms aimed at implementing the fairness 
principles for decision making (Fuller 1961; Greenberg 1987; Konow 2003). Normally, if a tax system is to be 
viewed as procedurally fair, it ought to fit into the six principles against which fairness of procedures is measured 
(Leventhal 1980). According to Leventhal (1980), procedural fairness, government procedures need to be 
consistent, without bias, accurate, with the ability to be corrected, representative and encourage ethical behaviour. 
non-violation of these measures would encourage tax compliance behaviour among taxpayers as procedures would 
be perceived as fair (Leventhal, Karuza & Fry 1980). Barret-Howard & Tyler (1986) and Greenberg (1987) 
suggested consistency as the most powerful criterion for procedural fairness. This means that setting out fair 
procedures within the tax system for the tax identification, registration, assessment and tax collection could 
stimulate taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness in such a system and tax compliance. Once the procedures employed 
in the assessment and collection of taxes are viewed as unfair, high non-compliance inclinations may result. If they 
are not, compliance may be experienced. According to Saad (2011), taxpayers will ordinarily assess the 
consistency of the application of procedures within the tax system when developing their fairness conclusions, 
with the expectation that the application is consistent over time and across taxpayers. Bias suppression is another 
significant characteristic of fairness procedures and asserts that no partisan or selfish treatment should be promoted 
in the application of tax system procedures. Besides, tax system procedures should promote accuracy to create 
perceptions of fairness when taxpayers make decisions based on the available information. The system should also 
provide for flexibility, so that taxpayers are able to make adjustments for any incorrect decisions made, to fulfil 
the requirements of the correctability measure. 
2.3.2 Trust in authorities and tax compliance 
Trust in authorities implies that taxpayers and social groups believe that the tax authorities are benevolent and 
work for the common good of society (Kirchler et al. 2008; Kogler et al. 2013). Trust in authorities markedly has 
its prominence from perceptions of tax fairness, a target for every economy in order to boost tax compliance 
(Bobek 1997). Indeed, taxpayers will be able to trust the government and tax authorities if the allocation and 
allocative procedures as well as tax administration procedures are perceived as appropriate. For instance, trust will 
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be developed if governments use public resources to reduce the gaps that may exist between the rich and poor 
through the provision of goods and services that would probably not be provided efficiently by the private sector. 
It may also mean that taxpayers who earn less may not be taxed in the same way as the rich (Jackson & Milliron 
1986; Saad 2010), which can be interpreted as equal treatment of all taxpayers who are at similar income levels 
(Niesiobedzka 2014).  
According to Kornhauser (2007) and identification with a group or society might change individuals’ 
positioning of self-interest to collective orientation, focusing majorly on what fits for the group members as a 
whole creating the basis of trust. Trustworthy engagements by government engender social trust by instituting a 
shared identity or social bond (Braithwaite 1995). Therefore, the social norm of trust held by that group can form 
the societal foundation in the perceptions of trustworthy arrangements by government. Additionally, Wenzel (2004) 
finds that social norms have a significant effect when identification with the group of people to whom the norms 
are attributed is sturdier. If trust is then considered as a social norm, then the social norm of trust will be 
strengthened with the stronger identity with the social group. Indeed, the notion of trust as a social norm has been 
confirmed by Ben-Ner & Halldorsson (2010), Ashraf, Bohnet & Plankov (2006), and Castelfranchi & Falcone 
(2001). As Wenzel (2002) demonstrates, procedural fairness of the tax authorities might be mostly influential in 
motivating tax compliance among citizens who strongly identify with the notion of trust. Also, at a higher level, 
tax authorities might be perceived as archetypal of taxpayers when they exemplify the principles and standards of 
trustworthiness, fairness, neutrality (Bornman 2015). This means that taxpayers’ identification with authorities 
might lead to perception of authorities to be more legitimate, fair and trustworthy (Taylor 2002) which can enhance 
tax compliance (Bobek, Hageman & Kelliher 2015; Bobek, Hageman & Kelliher 2012).  
Kirchler, Hofmann & Gangl (2012) make a distinction between reason-based trust and implicit trust as the 
two merits of trust, resulting from Castelfranchi and Falcone’s work. Trust as a mental attitude can either be goal-
based or belief-based (Castelfranchi & Falcone 2010; Kirchler et al. 2012). Reason-based trust rests upon a rational 
decision to trust another person based on whether the trustee and trustor have the same goals, which is akin to 
procedural fairness. However, implicit trust is a reflex and emotional reaction derived from social relationships 
that ensue between people, and conditioned learning processes and memory that is similar to legitimacy and 
identity (Bornman 2015). Whether reason-based trust or implicit trust, the ultimate result is likely to be higher 
motivation for the taxpayers like SMEs to comply with the requirements of the tax rules. Again, one would wonder 
whether trust in the general government influence trust in tax authority particularly in circumstances where people 
feel the presence of high corrupt and wasteful practices in government. Yet it’s believed that trust would be most 
needed where significant conflicts of interest exists (Balliet, Mulder & Van Lange 2011). This might actually 
provide a signal that corruption might have an influence on the relationship between social psychological factors 
and tax compliance of SMEs in Uganda. From this discussion, we propose that: 
H3. Social psychological factors have a significant relationship with tax compliance. 
 
2.4 Perceived corruption as Potential Moderator 
Significant evidence on how the economic and social psychological factors affect tax compliance behaviour 
continue to be inconsistent and inadequate. Several studies for example reveal wide-ranging findings of the effects 
of audit probability and detection on tax compliance (Stefura 2012; Palil & Mustapha 2011; Cummings et al. 2004; 
Kirchler 2007; Alm et al. 2004; Slemrod et al. 2001; Allingham & Sandmo 1972) and the effects of tax rates on 
tax compliance (e.g. Chau & Leung 2009; Barbuta-Misu 2011; Pommerehne & Weck-Hannemann 1996; Alm et 
al. 1992; Feinstein 1991; Porcano 1988; Clotfelter 1983; Allingham & Sandmo 1972). Mixed findings have also 
been revealed regarding the effect of tax complexity on tax compliance (Saad 2014; Sawyer 2007; McKerchar 
2003; Forest & Sheffrin 2002). Similar inconsistent results have been reported for tax fairness to the extent that 
self-reported past evaders even perceived the tax system as fairer than non-evaders (Porcano 1988). Similarly, 
numerous studies have examined the effects of distributive fairness on tax compliance however, their findings 
remain mixed (Wenzel 2002).  
With the inconsistency in the results that the existing studies report as regards the relationship between 
economic factors and social psychological factors on tax compliance, it may appear that an introduction of a 
moderator as has been recommended in the extant literature (Baron & Kenny 1986). While Picur & Riahi‐Belkaoui 
(2006) provide a discussion on the effects of noneconomic factors like perceptions of corruption and other related 
features, they affirm that these factors could actually moderate the effects of deterrent and social psychological 
constructs on tax compliance. Furthermore, Rahmani, Komijani & Fallahi (2012) argue that when a country has 
minimal incidences of corruption, tax compliance is likely to improve as taxpayers might develop the willingness 
to pay taxes. This would generally imply that high corruption perceptions like petty corruption, petty tax corruption, 
political corruption and grand corruption might negatively influence the willingness to pay taxes, hence tax 
noncompliance. Bringing this in line with the social exchange theory, trust is built on social interactions and can 
only be sustained if these relationships are beneficial to the parties involved (Diekmann, Jann, Przepiorka & 
Wehrlia 2014; Serva, Fuller & Mayer 2005; Blau 1964). Consequently, when taxpayers notice the government is 
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corrupt, meaning that not all the taxes paid are put to good use in the provision of public goods and services, then 
taxpayers might feel like they are being cheated which may as a consequence affect their tax compliance potential. 
Henceforth, in this study we suggest that perceptions of corruption (i.e. petty corruption, petty tax corruption, 
political corruption and grand corruption) might significantly make a contribution in appreciating the 
inconsistencies in the existing results regarding the relationships between both the deterrent factors (e.g. audit 
probability and detection, sanctions, tax rates and tax complexity) and social psychological factors (tax fairness, 
trust in authorities) on tax compliance. Additionally, we argue that the strength of the relationships between 
deterrent factors and social psychological factors on tax compliance might be affected if the tax system is perceived 
as unfair.  
Considering our preceding discussions of prior results and theory, we can rationally argue that the level of 
the perceptions of corruption might influence the tax compliance behaviour of taxpayers irrespective of how the 
tax system is perceived as fair or the trustworthiness of the tax authorities and how strong the deterrent factors 
(like detection rates, sanctions with high tax rates) are believed to be. Moreover, little is known about the 
moderating effects of the perceptions of corruption on the relationships between deterrent factors and social 
psychological factors on tax compliance behaviour, notwithstanding the rationalization for the foregoing 
proposition. In principle, the two drivers of tax compliance namely social psychological factors and deterrent 
factors might be inadequate in offering the explanation for tax compliance the puzzle, a combination of both 
deterrent and a social psychological factors blended with perceptions of corruption as a moderator might be used 
to offer a judicious clarification to the tax compliance puzzle. Consequently, we offer the following proposal: 
H4: perceptions of corruption can moderate the effect of the relationships between deterrent factors and social 
psychological factors on tax compliance. 
 
3. Conceptualised framework 
This proposed conceptual framework as represented in Figure 1 below builds on the foregoing inconsistencies in 
the empirical results describing the relationships between deterrent and social psychological factors on tax 
compliance as an impending research problem. The central objective of this scholarship thus is to offer proposition 
regarding the moderating role of the perceptions of corruption on the relationships between deterrent and social 
psychological factors on tax compliance behaviour of the owners and managers small and medium enterprises in 
Uganda. 
 
Figure 1. Proposed conceptual framework 
Figure 1 proposes a conceptual framework which demonstrates the moderating role of perceptions of 
corruption of the relationships that exist between the deterrent factors (audit probability and detection, sanctions, 
tax complexity and tax rates) and social psychological factors (tax fairness and trust in authorities) on tax 
compliance. Social psychological factors as well as deterrent factor might have significant effects on tax 
compliance of SME taxpayers as has been demonstrated by the existing scholarship.  Though the social 
psychological factors like tax fairness and trust in authorities have been introduced given the suggestion that 
deterrent factors are inadequate in motivating tax compliance among taxpayers, compliance has still remained low 
among SMEs in developing countries like Uganda which is a puzzle. Therefore, the introduction of an additional 
social psychological factor in the perceptions of corruption in the two models could support in providing an 
explanation of the tax compliance behaviour of the SME owners and managers which might be due to the 
distortions in public provision arising from perceptions of corruption. Existence of the perceptions of corruption 
might affect the probability of tax compliance if they are preceded by the public provision distortions.  
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In this study, we propose a model depicting the potential moderating influence of the perceptions of corruption on 
the relationships that exist between deterrent and social psychological factors and tax compliance behaviour as 
Figure 1 demonstrates. We believe that this model reveals significant implications which might support in 
understanding which factors could affect the tax compliance behaviour of SME owners and managers, which might 
be of greater importance generally. First of all, the framing of this study infers the fact that positivist approach 
might be used in future researches if the conceptual framework presented in this study is authenticated. This means 
that a quantitative approach will be adopted in data collection, analysis and reporting of results. These results are 
likely to provide significant insights to academics, policy makers at Ministry of Finance, policy implementers at 
Uganda Revenue Authority, and practitioners. Second, the findings in utilising this model might as well bring 
insights to the Government of Uganda on the possibilities of reducing the effects of the perceptions of corruption 
so as to achieve public revenue sustainability. 
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